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An Empirical Investigation of
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Management in Texas: The Edwards
Aquifer Case
ABSTRACT
Texas Senate Bill 1477 changed the rules governing water appropria-
tion in the Edwards Aquifer from a "rule of capture" to a "permit
system." This article discusses some of the factors that explain the
institutional change and empirically estimates the likely impact of the
change. The article concludes that industrial and municipal water
users benefited from the introduction of water marketing even though
overall welfare declined. Also, the state's objective to protect
endangered species was achieved with increased flows to key rivers,
streams, bays, and estuaries in the aquifer region.
I. INTRODUCTION
Institutions are critical in promoting or hindering economic growth
and welfare in a society, and one scholar has suggested that economic
theory as a body of knowledge should be expanded to explicitly account for
the role of institutions.' The term "institution" is used in two senses in
economics literature. First, the term may refer to a physical organization
that influences or regulates activity, such as a bank or a university or, for
* The authors are respectively Professor, Regents' Professor, and Research Scientist,
Department of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University. This article is the outcome
of a true division of labor and hence seniority of authorship is shared and shared alike. The
research was sponsored by funds from the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station and the
Texas Advanced Research/Technology Program. The authors wish to thank Todd Votteler,
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority; Agatha Wade and Gene Camargo, San Antonio Water
System; Greg Ellis, Edwards Aquifer Authority; Stuart Henry, Attorney, Sierra Club; Diane
Wassenich, San Marcos River Foundation; and Ron Kaiser, Jose Pena, and Ric Jensen, all
faculty colleagues at Texas A&M University. Mukesh Masand and Tolu Olufinbiyi, both
graduate students, were responsible for data collection, tables, and figures.
1. Feeny states that "the traditional three pillars of economic theory -endowments,
technologies, and preferences - are incomplete. The fourth and implicit pillar is institutions."
David Feeny, The Demand for and Supply of Institutional Arrangements, in RETI-NKING
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT: IssuEs, ALTERNATIVES, AND CHOICES 159, 159
(Vincent Ostrom et al. eds., 1988). Oliver Williamson has discussed the role of institutions in
a market economy extensively. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM (1985).
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the purposes of this discussion, the Edwards Aquifer Authority (Authority)
and the San Antonio Water System (SAWS).2 Second, the term may also
refer to the "rules of the game"3 or "working rules,"4 encompassing the
laws, regulations, customs, norms, mores, and conventions in a society.
The focus in this article is more on institutions as rules of the game
as they govern groundwater use and determine the limits to economizing
behavior by private parties. Since an understanding of the factors
influencing change is needed to predict the path of future changes, a major
concern in institutional analysis is whether the rules emerge as a result of
private bargaining, government fiat, or a combination of bargaining among
private parties and the government.
The sources of institutional change comprise a perennial issue in the
scholarship on institutions. Historians, economists, and lawyers at the
forefront of the research on institutional change agree that individual choice
and wealth-maximizing behavior in response to new resource scarcity
scenarios are primary sources of institutional change.s Also important in
institutional analysis is the recognition that institutional changes are
defined by and occur because of the unique environment within which the
change occurs.6 Given the diversity and number of societies, one could
2. Bromley goes to great lengths to make distinctions between institutions as
organizations and as rules of the game. DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND
INSTITUTIONS: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 22-23 (1989). "One of the
primary shortcomings of the model of induced institutional innovation arises over the
treatment of institutions as both rules of organizations, and as the organizations themselves."
Id. at 27.
3. See Lance Davis & Douglass North, Institutional Change and American Economic Growth:
A First Step Towards a Theory of Institutional Innovation, 30 J. ECON. HIST. 131, 132 (1970).
4. This phrase was coined by John R. Commons, who defined institutions as "collective
action in restraint, liberation, and expansion of individual action." BROMLEY, supra note 2, at
43.
5. For an analysis of institutional change in a historical context, see DOUGLASS C. NORTH
& ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973).
For contributions in a law and economics context, see A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER,
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1987) and Gary D. Libecap,
Economic Variables and the Development of the Law: The Case ofWestern Mineral Rights, 38 J. ECON.
HIST. 338 (1978).
6. In a series of case studies of how different societies designed institutions to deal with
problems of resource depletion, Elinor Ostrom concluded,
The primary substantive lesson from these cases is that it is possible for
humans to break out of the logic that yields a tragedy of the commons and
to restructure the situation itself. Thus it is important for policy analysts to
recognize the difference between making assumptions during an analysis
and presuming these assumptions are immutable. There cannot be "one best
way" of organizing the management of natural resource systems.
Elinor Ostrom, Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma, in RETHINKING
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 101, 119.
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understand why there is such an extensive literature on the importance of
institutional research to public policy making.
Changes in institutions governing groundwater resources,
specifically the Edwards Aquifer in Texas, present an opportunity to revisit
the issue of sources and impacts of institutional change.7 This article
presents an empirical analysis of institutional changes to manage the
aquifer and addresses two basic questions: (1) What demand and supply
forces influenced the institutional change in the management of the aquifer?
and (2) What is the jurisprudence of these institutional changes - the cost of
the change, its distributional impacts, including the impacts on total welfare
gains and losses, and endangered species protection? The results stemming
from the study may be useful in exploring future sources and direction of
change in the water sector in Texas.8
Section I concludes with a description of the aquifer and its
importance to the central Texas region and a brief discussion of Texas
groundwater law. Section II discusses various theories of the sources of
institutional change. The first part of the discussion focuses on the property
rights theory of institutional change since property rights concerns have
been central to the discussion of aquifer water rights. The second part
presents a generalized theory of the sources of institutional change. The
discussion then pulls together critical elements from various theories of
institutional change and how these apply in the context of the aquifer
region. In section III, an aquifer level model, the Edwards Aquifer
Simulator-River Model (EDSRM) is employed to explore the jurisprudence
of the changes that occurred. 9 The section compares the quantifiable and
non-quantifiable costs associated with the change against computed welfare
benefits and losses due to the change and other policy goals anticipated
under the change. Conclusions and policy implications are presented in
section IV.
7. This study will not be the first to examine the issue of institutional changes in the
context of groundwater resources. E.g., Ostrom, supra note 6, at 108-11 (providing a case
study of institutional changes within the West basin in California). For a review of
groundwater laws and regulations, see BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER
MARKETS IN THEORY AND PRACICE: MARKET TRANSFERS, WATER VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1987).
8. Davis and North have suggested that a useful model of institutional innovation must
be able to predict two kinds of things:
(1) Given any established set of institutions and some disequilibrating force,
the model ought to predict whether the newly emerging institutions will be
purely individual, involve some form of voluntary cooperation, or rely on
the coercive power of government; (2) It should provide some estimate of
the period of time that is likely to elapse between the initiating
disequilibrium and the establishment of the new (or mutated) institutions.
Davis & North, supra note 3, at 132.
9. See infra note 128.
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A. The Importance of the Edwards Aquifer
The Edwards Aquifer extends through eight counties in central
Texas,1 ° and the contribution of the aquifer to the economic development of
the region is immense. With a population of over one million people -
projected to double by the year 2050- the City of San Antonio and the
surrounding metropolitan area are major users of water from the aquifer.
In accord with population growth, municipal water demand is projected to
more than double within the period. Because San Antonio is heavily
dependent on the aquifer for its water supply, pumping restrictions as a
component of drought or overall aquifer management could have
significant impacts on municipal and industrial water prices.
For example, analyses have shown that if pumping is limited to
340,000 annual acre-feet, municipal and industrial water prices would rise
by about 37 percent by the year 2012. When pumping limits are further
reduced to about 175,000 acre-feet per year, water prices nearly double
from $701 per acre-foot to about $1,389 per acre-foot per year.12
As shown in Table 1,13 the aquifer is also critical to agricultural
producers. Model predictions for agricultural impacts from aquifer
pumping restrictions indicate that restricting pumping to 175,000 acre-feet
per year will cause irrigated cotton, oilseeds, and other irrigated crops to
disappear from the aquifer region. Irrigation-related employment will fall
by as much as 50 percent in certain parts of the region. The gross regional
product14 is also projected to fall by almost 50 percent with consequent
losses for private businesses and local jurisdictions providing public
10. The Edwards Aquifer extends 180 miles from Brackettville in Kinney County to Kyle
in Hays County. Edwards Aquifer Authority, Our Aquifer: History, http://www.
edwardsaquifer.org/pages/history.htm (last visited Mar. 8,2007). The counties are Atascosa,
Bexar, Caldwell, Comal, Guadalupe, Hays, Medina, and Uvalde. Edwards Aquifer Authority
Act art. 1, § 1.02(a), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2351.
11. S. CENT. TEX. REG. WATER PLANNINGGROUP, SOUTH CENTRAL TExAS REGIONAL WATER
PLANNING AREA: REGIONAL WATER PLAN 2-12 (2001) (total municipal use in the South Central
Region in 1990 was 318,495 acre-feet per year (afy) and is projected to increase to 769,523 afy
by 2050).
12. Lonnie L. Jones et al., Economic Impacts of Edwards Aquifer Pumping Restriction
Alternatives to Meet Habitat Conversion Plan Requirements 8-9 (Mar. 15, 2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
13. Compiled by the author based on data from TEx. AGRIc. ExTENSION SERV., DISTRICT
10: ESTIMATED VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND RELATED ITEMS, 1997-2000, 2001
PROJECTED (2001), and TEx. WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TExAS (1990).
14. Gross regional product (GRP) refers to the total value of all goods and services
produced in the region in a given year.
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services such as schools, health services, and police and fire protection.1 5
Table 1 also shows that restrictions on aquifer pumping would have a
significant negative effect on farmers in Medina, Uvalde, and Hays
counties.
15. Jones et al., supra note 12, at 42.
Winter 20071
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Other studies have addressed the importance of habitat and species
preservation, including recreational activities in the aquifer region. The
aquifer supports five major springs: Leona, San Antonio, San Pedro, Comal,
and San Marcos. Comal Springs at New Braunfels and San Marcos Springs
at San Marcos are the largest, providing the base flow of the Guadalupe
River and its tributaries. The springs support local tourist activities and
amusement parks. San Marcos and Comal Springs are the only habitat of
five federally listed endangered and threatened species: the fountain darter,
the San Marcos gambusia, the San Marcos salamander, the Texas blind sala-
mander, and Texas wild rice. The region is also home to two endangered
birds: the golden-cheeked warbler and the black-capped vireo. 6
Environmental concerns have been rising in the Edwards region.
Recently, the San Marcos River Foundation filed an application for
approximately 1.15 million acre-feet of instream water rights in the San
Marcos River and the Guadalupe River. The goal is to guarantee adequate
flows to bays and estuaries. The success of this application is dependent on
the health of the aquifer because, while ordinarily the aquifer contributes
about 50 percent of the base flow of the two river systems, this contribution
could be as high as 90 percent during periods of extreme drought. 7
The pressure for institutional change to address the human and
ecological dependence on the aquifer is revealed in Figure 1, which shows
aquifer discharge 8 as a percentage of recharge from 1934 through 1999. A
general conclusion that one could draw is that, over the period, recharge -
"water entering an underground aquifer through faults, fractures, or direct
absorption"19 - has declined relative to discharge. Well pumping has been
quite dramatic over the years and has not been matched by natural recharge
of the aquifer. Since 1934, observed spring flow per unit of recharge has
fallen about one percent per year largely from the growth of water
withdrawals, which have risen from 18 percent of long-run average
recharge to 81 percent.20 It is against this backdrop that the introduction of
16. Ben F. Vaughan IV & Peter M. Emerson, Protecting the Edwards Aquifer: An Efficient
and Ecological Alternative, in WATER MARKETING-THE NEXT GENERATION 167, 168 (Terry L.
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997). The Edwards-dependent species are listed and defined
at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11, 17.12 (2005).
17. Letter from Dianne Wassennich, President, San Marcos River Foundation, to Fred
Boadu, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University (jan. 31, 2002) (on file
with author).
18. Aquifer discharge consists of ground water that is pumped from the aquifer through
wells and water that is discharged naturally as spring water.
19. Gregg Eckhardt, Glossary of Water Resource Terms, EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBsITE,
http://www.edwardsaquifer.net/glossary.html#R (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
20. ROBERT A. COLLINGE Er AL., TEx. WATER REsoURCEs INsr. REPORT No. TR-159, THE
EDWARDS AQUIFER: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 (1993), available at http:twri.tamu.edu/
reports/1993/tr159/tr159.pdf.
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a catfish farm that relied on a well capable of yielding 40,000 gallons of
water per minute raised so much alarm in the aquifer region.2'
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B. Groundwater Law in Texas
Texas has a dual water law regime. Surface water is owned by the
State of Texas in trust for all citizens of the state.' A party who wishes to
21. The Living Waters Artesian Catfish Farm was opened by Ron Pucek in Bexar County
in 1991. The farm was pumping enough water to support about 250,000 households. The City
of San Antonio was forced to purchase Pucek's water rights for $9 million in order to protect
the aquifer and have water available for use by households. Gregg Eckhardt, Ron Pucek's
Living Waters Catfish Farm, EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBSITE, http://www.edwardsaquifer.net/
pucek.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
22. The Texas Water Code states,
(a) The water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing
river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of
Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every river,
Winter 20071
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appropriate surface water must obtain a permit from the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality (TCEQ).23 On the other hand, ground water is
private property owned by the person who brings the water to the surface,
known as "the rule of capture."24 Texas adopted the English Common Law
rule in 1840 and in 1904, in the case of Houston & Texas Central Railway Co.
v. East,2 officially adopted the rule of absolute dominion and liability for
use of groundwater resources.
Texas courts have held that the only limitations known under the
rule of capture are that the owner may not "maliciously take water for the
sole purpose of injuring his neighbor, or wantonly and willfully waste it."26
The current application and limitations on the "rule of capture" are best
stated in the case of Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest
Industries,27 in which the Texas Supreme Court refused to abandon the rule'
natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in the state is the
property of the state.
(b) Water imported from any source outside the boundaries of the state for
use in the state and which is transported through the beds and banks of any
navigable stream within the state or by utilizing any facilities owned or
operated by the state is the property of the state.
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon 1999).
23. "The right to the use of state water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner
and for the purposes provided in this chapter. When the right to use state water is lawfully
acquired, it may be taken or diverted from its natural channel." Id. § 11.022.
24. "The ownership and rights of the owners of the land and their lessees and assigns in
groundwater are hereby recognized, and nothing in this code shall be construed as depriving
or divesting the owners or their lessees and assigns of the ownership or rights, subject to rules
promulgated by a district." Id. § 36.002.
25. The Supreme Court of Texas stated the English Rule as follows:
That the person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is
there found to his own purposes, at his free will and pleasure; and that if, in
the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from
the underground springs in his neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his
neighbor falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot
become the ground of an action.
Houston & Tex. Cent. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279,280 (Tex. 1904) (quoting Acton v. Blundell,
(1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex.)). Texas's adoption of the English Rule was reaffirmed in City
of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Tex. 1955).
26. City of Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 801.
27. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
28. Referring to its own previous ruling, the Supreme Court of Texas stated,
At a time when the trend in other jurisdictions was away from the English
rule and toward the "reasonable use" rule, the English rule was reaffirmed
by this Court in City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton. The Court said,
"With both rules before it, this Court in 1904, adopted, unequivocally, the
'English' or 'Common Law' rule." The opinion in the case shows quite
clearly that the court weighed the merits of the two rules-"The practical
reasons upon which the courts base their conclusions [applying the 'English'
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given the potentially large reliance costs29 but was also willing to redefine
the limits of applicability of the rule of capture.3°
Texas courts and commentators have said that the responsibility for
regulating ground water lies with the legislature and not the courts.3 This
view is grounded in the Constitution of Texas, which states, inter alia, "The
conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this
State...and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources
of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights and duties; and
the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto."32
Section 59(a) of the Texas Constitution was introduced at the height
of a major drought in the 1900s. 33 Again in the 1990s when there was a
major drought, the legislature answered with Senate Bill (SB) 1, which
rule] fully meet the more theoretical view of the New Hampshire Court
[applying the 'American' rule] and satisfy us of the necessity of the
doctrine" - and, whether wisely or unwisely, made a deliberate choice.
Id. at 26 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
29. "The rule has been relied upon by thousands of farmers, industries, and
municipalities in purchasing and developing vast tracts of land overlying aquifers of
underground water." Id. at 29. "Reliance is, simply, the opportunity cost of the broken
promise." CHARLES J. GOETz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMIcs 257 (1984). A
sudden change in the rule would have imposed detrimental reliance costs on the farmers,
ranchers, industries, and households that have made water consumption decisions based on
the long-standing rule.
30. This case, however, gives the Court its first opportunity to recognize, and to
encourage compliance with, the policy set forth by the Legislature and its
regulatory agencies in an effort to curb excessive underground water
withdrawals and resulting land subsidence. It also affords us the
opportunity to discard an objectionable aspect of the court-made English
rule as it relates to subsidence by stating a rule for the future which is more
in harmony with expressed legislative policy. We refer to the past immunity
from negligence which heretofore has been afforded ground water
producers solely because of their "absolute" ownership of the water.
Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d at 29.
31. Id. at 26.
32. TEX. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 59. One commentator has made an observation about the
incidence of droughts and legislative response:
Texas water law has evolved within a pattern of key litigation and
legislation following major droughts. For example, after the 1996 drought,
the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 1 in 1997. The Texas Water
Development Board is the agency leading the effort to plan for future water
supply needs of the state in line with this legislation.
Todd H. Votteler, WATER: The Drought of Record, the Edwards Aquifer, and San Antonio's Water
Future, BUSINESS S.A., Sept. 1998, at 5, 7.
33. The Glossary of Meteorology defines droughts as "periods of abnormally dry weather
sufficiently prolonged for the lack of water to cause a serious imbalance in the affected area."
AM. METEOROLOGICAL Soc., GLOSSARY OF METEOROLOGY (1959). Article XVI, section 59(a) of
the Texas Constitution was enacted in response to the droughts of 1910 and 1917. See also
Votteler, supra note 32 (discussing "droughts of record").
Winter 2007]
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significantly changed the procedure for water resource planning in the
State.' While it is true that the legislature has responded to water scarcity
over time, the failure to act to avoid the lengthy litigation that has
characterized the management of the aquifer reflects the depth of the power
of strategic groups in the supply of institutional change.
C. The Change in Institutional Arrangements
The major drought of the 1950s led to the creation of the Edwards
Underground Water District (EUWD) in 1959. Charged with the
responsibility of conserving and managing water in the aquifer,35 the
EUWD was quite limited in power, as it had no authority to limit pumping
from the aquifer or to regulate the drilling of wells. 6
One explanation for this powerlessness may be the rather high
bargaining cost associated with seeking consensus within a heterogeneous
group with entrenched positions and conflicting interests.37 There are some
who may argue that the assessment of the EUWD is unduly harsh. Clearly
from its statute, the EUWD was vested with considerable power to make a
change in the management of the aquifer.3 If the power of the EUWD was
limited, it was because of the conflicting interests and not as a result of its
statutory grant.
A turning point in institutional evolution occurred when the Sierra
Club filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for failure to
enforce the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to protect the endangered
species that depend on adequate flow of aquifer water.39 The court ruled
that, if unprotected, the Edwards-dependent species would be "taken" as
34. See Votteler, supra note 32, at 7.
35. See generally Gregg Eckhardt, Laws and Regulations Applicable to the Edwards Aquifer,
EDWARDS AQUIFER WEBSITE, http://www.edwardsaquifer.net/rules.htnl (last visited June
11, 2007).
36. Id. ("However, [the EUWD] had no authority to restrict groundwater pumping, and
for over 40 years it was mainly a data collection agency.").
37. See Linda L. Putnam & Tarla Peterson, The Edwards Aquifer Dispute: Shifting Frames
in a Protracted Conflict, in MAKING SENSE OF INTRACTABLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS 127,
130-31 (Roy Lewicki et al. eds., 2002) ("In the words of one environmentalist...: 'The EUWD
did not have the regulatory authority that even some other groundwater districts had to be
able to manage withdrawal of water from the aquifer. They had many conflicting
interests- political interests in San Antonio, agricultural interests in Uvalde and Medina, and
springs interests in Hays and Comal counties-and no overall mechanism to reach any
conclusions about how the aquifer should be managed. So it was pretty chaotic.'").
38. The EUWD was created to "manage, conserve, preserve, and protect the aquifer and
to increase the recharge of, and prevent the waste or pollution of water in, the aquifer."
Edwards Aquifer Authority Act § 1.08(a), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350.
39. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 36 ERC 1533,1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3361,42, No. MO-91-CA-069,
1993 WL 151353, at 34 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 1993).
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defined under the ESA. The court ordered the State of Texas to limit
pumping from the aquifer and threatened to develop and implement its
own scheme if this was not done.'
The Texas Legislature responded to the judge's order with the
passage of Senate Bill 1477, the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (Act),41
which imposed significant changes in the management of the aquifer. First,
the Act set up the Authority, a new institution to manage water
withdrawals from the aquifer.4 Second, while the Act did not extinguish the
rights of existing landowners,43 it subjected water withdrawals from the
aquifer to a permitting scheme similar to the rules governing surface
water.44 Third, to protect against the adverse effects of droughts and to
remedy the adverse environmental impacts of excessive withdrawals from
the aquifer, the Act placed pumping limits on water withdrawals, 45
mandated minimum springflows to protect endangered species,' and laid
40. See Eckhardt, supra note 35 (suggesting that the implementation of the court's plan
would mean that the federal government would be in charge of the aquifer).
41. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 626.
42. "A conservation and reclamation district to be known as the Edwards Aquifer
Authority is created in all or part of Atascosa, Bexar, Caldwell, Comal, Guadalupe, Hays,
Medina, and Uvalde counties. A confirmation election is not necessary. The authority is a
governmental agency and a body politic and corporate." Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art.
1, § 1.02(a) "[The] authority is created under and is essential to accomplish the purposes of
Article XVI, Section 59, of the Texas Constitution." Id. art. 1, § 1.02(b). See also supra notes 23
and 24 for the proposition that changes in laws regulating the use of ground water in the State
of Texas are the responsibility of the legislature. See infra Part II of this article for a detailed
analysis of the EAAA and the demise of the EUWD, a parent institution to the Edwards
Aquifer Authority. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art. 1, § 1.41.
43. The ownership and rights of the owner of land and the owner's lessees and
assigns, including holders of recorded liens or other security interests in
land, in underground water and the contract rights of any person who
purchases water for the provision of potable to the public or for the resale
of potable water to the public for any use are recognized....
Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art. 1, § 1.07.
44. "Except as provided by Sections 1.17 and 1.33 of article 1, a person may not withdraw
water from the aquifer or begin construction of a well or other works designed for the
withdrawal of water from the aquifer without obtaining a permit from the authority." Id. art.
1, § 1.15 (b).
45. "[For the period ending December 31,2007, the amount of permitted withdrawals
from the aquifer may not exceed 450,000 acre-feet of water for each calendar year." Id. art. 1,
§ 1.14 (b); "[F lor the period beginning January 1, 2008, the amount of permitted withdrawals
from the Aquifer may not exceed 400,000 acre-feet for each calendar year." Id. art. 1, § 1.14 (c).
46. [B]y June 1, 1994, the authority.. .shall implement and enforce water
management practices, procedures, and methods to ensure that, not later
than December 31,2012, the continuous minimum springflows of the Comal
Springs and the San Marcos Springs are maintained to protect endangered
and threatened species to the extent required by Federal law.
Id. art. 1, § 1.14(h).
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the foundation for water marketing.47 Reading these provisions together
leads to the conclusion that SB 1477 effectively ended the institutional
arrangement - the rule of capture as applied to the aquifer - and replaced
it with a permit system that promoted water marketing.
II. THE SOURCES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The institutional changes that have occurred with regard to the
Edwards Aquifer are not of a spontaneous origin. Since 1952 when the City
of San Antonio tried to address its water problems by joining in the
construction of Canyon Lake, an ongoing battle has raged between strategic
hierarchies and coalitions over what to do about water from the Aquifer.'
In the end, a long-standing groundwater rule, "the rule of capture," gave
way to a new institutional arrangement under which the aquifer is subject
to administrative management and water marketing as the preferred
governance mechanism to determine groundwater allocation. Indeed,
institutions for the management of aquifer water are still evolving and
present an opportunity to empirically test some of the major hypotheses
that have been advanced to explain institutional change.
There are three main theoretical explanations of institutional
change:49 (1) the Property Rights Model, (2) the Induced Technological
Change Model, and (3) the Davis and North Transaction Cost Model. David
Feeny has synthesized these three models to develop a general demand and
supply framework for explaining institutional change. The three basic
models are briefly discussed and Feeny's generalized framework is adapted
for an empirical analysis of the factors influencing institutional change
within the aquifer region.
A. Property Rights Model
Under the Property Rights Model, new institutions emerge for
individuals to take advantage of new opportunities that arise from new
knowledge, technological change, information, aspirations, and changes in
47. A permit holder may lease permitted water rights, but a holder of a permit for
irrigation use may not lease more than 50 percent of the irrigation rights initially permitted.
The user's remaining irrigation water rights must be used in accordance with the original
permit and must pass with transfer of the irrigated land. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art.
1, § 1.13(c).
48. The first attempt to form the Edwards Underground Water District was in 1955.
49. The description of the various models of institutional change is based largely on
BROMLEY, supra note 2, and Feeny, supra note 1.
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market values.' According to the proponents of this model, changes in
society present individuals with new cost-benefit opportunities. Those in
strategic positions may seek to capture the benefits from the change if the
benefits of capture outweigh its cost.
The distinguishing characteristic of the property rights model is that
it advocates the superiority of private property rights over other forms of
institutional arrangements. According to one author, a system of efficient
private property rights -characterized by universality, exclusivity, and
transferability -is superior to other institutional arrangements, at least in
terms of efficient resource allocation.5'
The issue of property rights was central in the debate over the
aquifer. First, as it applies to ground water in Texas, the "rule of capture"
acknowledges private property rights to water. The courts in Texas seem to
have also blessed private ownership of ground water.5 2 Second, some
debate continues as to what exactly constitutes a property right in ground
water. One school of thought is that the landowner has a property interest
only after the water has been brought to the surface and is in possession of
the landowner. Another school of thought is that the landowner actually
has property interest in the water even while the water is in the ground.'
50. Harold Demsetz is generally credited with articulating the theory of property rights.
As he explained it,
Changes in knowledge result in changes in production functions, market
values, and aspirations. New techniques, new ways of doing the same
things, and doing new things- all invoke harmful and beneficial effects to
which society has not been accustomed.... [T]he emergence of new property
rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for
adjustment to new benefit-cost possibilities.... [P]roperty rights develop to
internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than
the cost of internalization.
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,350 (1967); see also
RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONoMIcs ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
51. "The proper incentives [for economic efficiency] are created by the parceling out
among the members of society of mutually exclusive rights to the exclusive use of particular
resources" BROMLEY, supra note 2 (citing POSNER, supra note 50, at 10).
52. "It is of some importance to note that in the laws authorizing these regulatory
Underground Water Districts and the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, the
Legislature specifically confirmed private ownership of underground water." See
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 27 (Tex. 1978). See also Denis v.
Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235,236 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989) ("groundwater percolating
beneath the soil is the property of the owner of the surface who may, in the absence of malice,
appropriate such water while on his premises and make whatever use of it as he pleases")
(citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955)).
53. At a water law conference held in Texas several years ago, the issue of property rights
in ground water was discussed. One expert argued that
[w]hat the landowner has absolute ownership of... is the water after he has
removed it from the soil and reduced it to possession. How can the
landowner be said to be the absolute owner of the ground water beneath the
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While recent property rights advocates seem to prefer the latter position, a
more accurate view is that the "property right" is the right to "capture and
use," and not a right in the water in the ground per se. What is popularly
referred to as a "water right" should properly be called a "pumping right."
This debate reveals a rather ironic aspect of the institutional change that has
occurred in the aquifer region. The granting of pumping rights to a
specified quantity of ground water provides the security of property rights
to water that was not available under the rule of capture.
It is important at this point to clarify what has been labeled a
"property rights" group in the aquifer debate since the group represents
diverse interests and issues. The district court in the Sierra Club case split
amici briefs into two groups: those in favor of protecting the rule of capture,
translated by the group to mean no restrictions on pumping rights and the
protection of property rights,-" and those advocating a change in the rule of
capture to one of managed governance.'
surface of his land if the law gives him no remedy whatsoever for the
protection of that water against the acts of others?... [H]e does not even have
any property interest.
A.W. Walker, Jr., Theories of Ownership and Control of Oil and Gas Compared with Those of Ground
Water, PROC. WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIV. OF TEX., 121, 125 (1956) (quoted in WELLS A.
HuTcHINS ET AL., THE TEXAS LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 572 (1961) (internal quote marks deleted).
Contra Joe R. Greenhill, Well Spacing, PROC. WATER LAW CONFERENCE, UNIV. OF TEXAS 146,146
(1956) ("the owner of the surface does, with minor exceptions, own the water under it just as
he owns the oil and gas") (quoted in HUTCHINS, supra at 572) (internal quote marks deleted).
54. The following groups were generally in favor of retention of the rule of capture and
filed amici in support of their position: City of Houston; Texas Council of Forest Products
Manufacturers; Texas Water Conservation Association; Texas Groundwater Association;
Texas Alliance of Groundwater Districts; Edwards Aquifer Authority; North Plains Ground
Water Conservation District No. 2; American Land Foundation; Riverside and Landowners
Protection Coalition; Texas Justice Foundation; Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers
Association; Texas Cattle Feeders Association; Texas Association of Nurserymen, Inc.; and
Texas Farm Bureau.
55. Amici generally in favor of abandonment of the rule of capture included Aqua Water
Supply Corporation (AWSC), Environmental Defense Fund, and National Spring Water
Association (NSWA).
AWSC is a Texas non-profit corporation started in the 1970s when the U.S. Farm and
Home Administration extended loans and grants to spur start-up water systems all over the
United States to provide safe drinking water at reasonable prices to rural areas. Today AWSC
serves rural residents in a 910-square mile area in six counties, including most of Bastrop, Lee,
and Caldwell counties, and parts of eastern Travis, Fayette, and Williamson counties. See Aqua
Water Supply Corporation, http://www.aquawsc.com/ (follow "About Us" hyperlink).
The NSWA was established in 1993. Its membership consists of natural spring
owners, spring water bottlers, groundwater professionals, environmentalists, and interested
members of the public. The main purpose behind forming the organization was to protect and
encourage the protection of natural spring water resources and to promote the spring water
business, encourage sustained resource management, and inform the public of the differences
between true spring water and other waters. E-mail from Bill Miller, President, NSWA, to
Fred Boadu, June 19, 2007, 4:40 PM (on file with author).
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The property rights position is most associated with farmers,
landowners, and irrigators, who seek to maintain the rule of capture as a
way to have access to unlimited pumping rights. On the other hand, the
interest of a rule of capture advocate such as the City of Houston is not
immediately clear. One commentator has suggested that some of the parties
were probably more concerned about the change in groundwater use
liability rules in general than about an interest in property rights to water
per se. 6 This is a plausible explanation, especially in light of the opinion in
the Friendswood case, in which the court signaled the demise of the no
liability rule when harm is caused by groundwater withdrawals. 7 A similar
argument could be made regarding the support of the rule of capture by an
organization such as the Texas Justice Foundation (TJF) since it does not
directly use water from the aquifer. The TJF by its own mission statement
is set up to defend constitutional rights, free markets, parental rights, and
"property rights" whenever they find these rights threatened.'
Another complication is the extent to which the position of the
property rights groups changed over time. A study of the aquifer problem
as a case of conflict management shows how the positions of the various
groups changed over time.-9 According to the study, while the early stages
of the aquifer conflict were dominated with interest-based frames as depicted
in defending the sacred principle of "private property rights," preserving
56. E-mail from Todd Votteler, Ph.D., Executive Manager of Intergovernmental Relations
and Policy, Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority, to author (Mar. 20,2002) (on file with author).
57. See Friendswood Dev. Co., 576 S.W.2d 21.
58. The TJF has been involved in several property rights litigations including Bragg v.
Edwards Aquifer, 71 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. 2002), where TJF brought suit against the Edwards
Aquifer Authority (EAA), claiming that EAA's denial of Bragg's pumping rights was
unconstitutional and would put the clients out of business (the court found the EAA's well
permitting rules void because the EAA failed to prepare a Taking Impact Analysis as required
by the Texas Real Property Rights Preservation Act); Davidson v. Babbitt, where TJF
represented a couple denied the right to build a home on their land because of a golden
cheeked warbler (couple finally is allowed to build a home); Medearis v. Brazoria County
Drainage District No. 4, Dist. Ct. Brazoria County, 149th Judicial Dist. Tex. (1995) (No. 95-M-
2313), brought under the Texas Real Property Rights Preservation Act of 1995 (the court held
that the drainage district had exceeded its authority and acted unconstitutionally by
committing a taking under the Texas Constitution). See The justice Foundation, www.txjf.org/
(go to "Landmark Cases," "Property Rights").
59. Putnam and Peterson have applied a model of conflict framing to the dispute over
the Edwards Aquifer. Framing refers to how people interpret or make sense of experiences
and the way they talk about what is most important or least important in a situation. The
authors focused on identity and characterization framing. Identity framing refers to
statements or phrases that reflect how the parties in a conflict describe their role, who they
are, what is important to them, and how their identity becomes vested in the conflict.
Characterization refers to the way that parties describe other people involved in the
conflict-ways they see the others as positive, negative, or neutral. See Putnam & Peterson,
supra note 37, at 150-58.
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the springs, and protecting local economies, these identities became place-
based as a battle between rural and urban counties. Later, when there was
a move to declare the aquifer an "underground river," identities shifted to
institutional domains, and stakeholders considered the jurisdictions of
federal, state, regional, and local authorities as frames for their ownidentities.60
To understand the shifts in identity one has to examine the
hydrogeology and movement of water in the aquifer. Imagine a large
"bowl" that is buried underground and stretches from west to east. Water
collects in this bowl but due to differences in elevation the water flows from
west to east. What is known as the "Knippa Gap" is a narrow barrier fault
that controls the flow of water from the west side of the aquifer to the
eastern side. The nature of the gap prevents huge amounts of water from
flowing quickly through the gap, so water piles up in storage units behind
it, causing water levels in wells to the west to display much less variability
than wells to the east.61 The western portion of the aquifer is in Uvalde and
parts of Medina counties, two major agriculture-based (primarily
vegetables) counties. Bexar County is to the east of the gap, and the major
water user is the City of San Antonio. With a distinct advantage over access
to large quantities of water, residents to the west of the Knippa Gap (rural)
have been resistant to changes in pumping rules, while those to the east of
the gap (urban) have supported controls over pumping to ensure adequate
water flows to the east.
The previous paragraphs suggest that an appropriate quantitative
index of the property rights model is the position of farmers (irrigators),
who have consistently opposed restrictions on water rights. The position of
the Farm Bureau is typical: "in areas of the state without groundwater
conservation districts, delegates supported the common law doctrine rule
of capture"; "[g]roundwater captured by a landowner should, by law, be
owned and fully controlled by the landowner and protected from seizure
by eminent domain"; and "[w]e oppose any state control of groundwater."62
In terms of water marketing, the property rights advocates provide a classic
example of identity frame shift. At their convention in year 2000, delegates
were generally supportive of water marketing as part of a water
management plan in the aquifer region: "District rules should not unreason-
60. See id.
61. This description of the aquifer and water movement is based on Gregg Eckhardt,
Hydrogeology of the Edwards Aquifer, EDWARDS AQUIFER WEsrrE, edwardsaquifer.net/ geology.
html#movement (last visited June 11, 2007).
62. Water, Farm Income Top Convention Issues, TEX. AGRIc., Dec. 15, 2000, http://www.
txfb.org/TexasAgriculture/2000/121500water.htm (statements by delegates at the Texas Farm
Bureau's 67th Annual Meeting).
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ably or unconstitutionally prohibit landowners from exercising their private
property right to use or market groundwater."'
This is a fundamental shift in position from 1993 when the
Authority legislation was being discussed: "farmers would support a
drought plan to limit pumping, but they opposed a permanent cap on
pumping and marketing provisions for buying and selling water rights."'
As stated by the president of the Uvalde County Water Conservation
Association, "You start buying water rights up and you are going to kill the
economy."' 5 Today landowners are fully in support of water marketing and
are even threatening legal action to remove a requirement in SB 1477 that
is intended to prevent stripping land of all water rights. To understand the
genesis of this issue, one must read sections 1.16 (e) and 1.34 (C) of the Act
together. Under section 1.16 (e), an irrigation user may obtain a permit after
demonstrating beneficial use for a "historical period" or shall receive a
permit "for not less than two acre-feet a year for each acre of land the user
actually irrigated in any calendar year during the historical period." Under
section 1.34 (C), "a holder of an irrigation permit may not lease more than
50 percent of the irrigation rights initially permitted. The user's remaining
irrigation water rights must be used in accordance with the original permit
and must pass with the transfer of the irrigated land." In short, there must
be at least one acre-foot of water left with each acre of land. This acre-foot
of water is called the "Base Acre-Foot." Conversations with experts at the
regulatory agencies seem to suggest that irrigators want the restriction on
the base acre-foot removed. The only problem according to one expert is the
transaction costs facing a single irrigator interested in starting a movement
to challenge the restriction, a classic example of the "free rider problem.
" 66
B. The Induced Institutional Change Model (Ruttan-Hayami)
The Ruttan-Hayami Model explicitly recognizes the interaction of
both demand and supply factors in institutional change. On the demand
side, individuals seek institutional change because the interaction of
technical change, factor endowments, and product demand brings forth a
new constellation of appropriable income. Increases in domestic water
demand coupled with new demands for protection of endangered species
and recreational uses have been important sources of pressures for change
in institutional arrangements. However, the appropriation of perceived
63. Id.
64. Putnam & Peterson, supra note 37, at 139.
65. Id. (citing SAN ANTONIO EXPREss NEws, Apr. 29, 1993).
66. Personal Communication with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer
Authority (Jan. 10, 2002).
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benefits does not occur in a vacuum but rather depends on the supply of
institutional innovation.
On the other hand, the supply of institutional innovation depends
on the cost to political entrepreneurs who design new institutions to
minimize costs associated with the political competition between strategic
coalitions that stand to gain from institutional change. If the private return
to the political entrepreneurs differs from the social return, institutional
change would not occur or, if it does, would not be supplied at a "socially
optimal level."
67
C. The North Model of Institutional Change
The North Model of Institutional Change distinguishes between
changes that occur to improve efficiency and those that redistribute
income.' The model focuses on efficiency-promoting change that increases
the net social benefit and identifies the four possible sources for increasing
incomes: market failure, economies of scale, externalities, and risk. Other
exogenous factors such as constitutional amendments, expansion in
franchises, or shifts in a community's preferences between public and
private solutions to problems may also lead to institutional changes.
Bromley has suggested that the North Model seems to fit a situation
where "there are few, if any, existing institutional arrangements in place to
organize a new economic activity... [where] there [is] an institutional
vacuum."69 Citing the evolution of the Prior Appropriation Doctrine in
Western water law in support of this view, Bromley explains that the
Riparian Rights Doctrine that was imported from England did not protect
a water user who wanted to invest in technology to carry water over long
distances for irrigation purposes. What was missing was an institutional
arrangement that guaranteed the security of investments in water
technology to encourage individuals to invest. The Prior Appropriation
Doctrine that replaced the Riparian Rights Doctrine provided the needed
security of tenure and made it possible for the needed investments in water
development to take place.7'
67. BROMLEY supra note 2, at 20 (citing Hayami & Ruttan).
68. When institutional change occurs to improve efficiency, at least one party (person
initiating change) is made better off under the change but no one is made worse off. Where
the outcome of institutional change is distributional, a party gains only at the expense of some
other party. Id. at 28.
69. Id. at 29.
70. Id.
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D. Generalized Demand and Supply Model of Institutional Change
David Feeny has combined the three models of institutional
innovation to develop what he describes as a "heuristic framework of the
demand for and supply of institutional change. " 7 He cautions that the
"framework identifies general categories of variables that must in turn be
given concrete form relevant to the particular historical or contemporary
institutional change being considered."72
1. Demand for Institutional Change
The underlying factor driving the demand for institutional change
is the desire to capture benefits made possible through (1) technology and
changes in relative product and factor prices, (2) the constitutional order,
and (3) the size of the market.
a. Technology and Changes in Relative Product and Factor Prices
The performance of the agriculture and water economies in the
aquifer region supports the proposition that changes in relative product and
factor prices have played an important role in the demand for institutional
changes. Largely due to population increases and dependence on the
aquifer as the sole source of its water supply, the City of San Antonio has
experienced significant increases in water rates over time.7 The projected
water needs have led to a search for options and practices that rely on the
application of new technology to lower the cost of water to consumers. 74 To
meet increasing demands in the near term, water authorities in San Antonio
are developing recharge enhancement projects, recycling of wastewater for
non-drinking purposes, aquifer storage and recovery programs, and
71. "The framework builds explicitly on the previous work of Davis, Hayami, North,
Ruttan, and Thomas." Feeny, supra note 1, at 173,176; see also BROMLEY, supra note 2, at 12,14,
18-31 (the Hayami and Ruttan model [induced institutional change model] is discussed and
critiqued extensively along with North and Thomas's Transaction Cost model).
72. The flexibility made possible by a general framework is especially useful for
adaptation to specific circumstances. The framework is in effect consistent with the
observations made in RETHINKING INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1.
73. San Antonio's water needs are projected to double by the year 2050. The Edwards
Aquifer will remain the main source of water for the foreseeable future. See SAN ANTONIO
WATER SYSTEM, PLANNING OUR FUTURE FOR THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, http://web.archive.
org/web/20041012175657/www.saws.org/our-water/future/ (last visited July 7, 2007).
74. Cf. Feeny, supra note 1, for the proposition that population increases that led to a
decline in real wages combined with technological changes in machinery and fertilizer use
that led to yield increases created disequilibria between harvest-share wage and prevailing




sustainable withdrawals from nearby aquifers.7' Technology is also driving
the search for new sources of water to meet long-term needs. A system of
river diversions and water treatment projects has been planned to meet the
water needs of the SAWS service area.76
Water users within the SAWS service area will pay higher prices for
water as a result of increasing demand. The San Antonio City Council has
approved a multi-year funding mechanism for the development of
additional water resources for the SAWS service area.7 The new graduated
fee schedule adds about three cents per 100 gallons in year 2001, rising to
about 13 cents per 100 gallons in year 2005. The revenue is earmarked
specifically for water development and represents a separate line item from
a consumer's regular water bill. Faced with rising water costs, one can
understand why authorities in the SAWS service area would demand
institutional changes that support the acquisition of rights to a greater share
of the Edwards Aquifer water.78
75. Approximately 7,000 acre-feet of sustained yield is expected to be available through
recharge by 2007 and roughly twice that amount over the longer term. Recycling of treated
wastewater effluent for irrigation and industrial uses will provide 35,000 acre-feet of non-
drinking water. Sustainable withdrawals from a portion of the Cow Creek formation of the
Trinity Aquifer in northern Bexar County could add about 4,500 acre-feet per year. SAWS has
acquired property in southeastern Bexar County for the Aquifer Storage and Recovery (ASR)
project using the Carrizo Aquifer as a storage facility. Water would be injected into this sand-
based aquifer during periods of rainfall excess and withdrawn during dry periods. This
process will yield an additional 30,000 acre-feet. See SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, SHORT-
TERM WATER SUPPLIES, http://web. archive.org/web/20041019113212/http://www.saws
.org/ our-water/future/shortjterm.shtml (last visited July 7, 2007).
76. Successful diversion from the lower part of the Guadalupe River basin near the Gulf
Coast could yield approximately 60,000 to 70,000 acre-feet. The purchase and transfer of
150,000 acre-feet may be available to SAWS from the Lower Colorado River Authority (LCRA)
at Bay City, while acquired ground water from the Simsboro Aquifer in Milam and Lee
counties could yield about 55,000 acre-feet. Desalination of seawater is also being considered.
See SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, LONG TERM WATER SUPPLIES, http://web.archive.org/
web/20041019112354/http:/ /www.saws.org/ our-water/ future/long-term.shtml (last
visited July 7, 2007).
77. See San Antonio, Tex., Code 92753 (2000) (renumbered as §§ 34-1431 to 34-1439). This
amends chapter 34 of the City Code of the City of San Antonio by adding a new article IX,
Water Supply Fee; SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, QUARTERLY REPORT ON WATER RESOURCES
(City of San Antonio), July-September 2005, available at http://www.saws.org/ourwater/
waterresources/ watersupply/.
78. San Antonio water authorities expect a permit from the Edwards Aquifer Authority
that would allow them to withdraw about 135,000 acre-feet of water per year through 2007
and 120,000 acre-feet per year thereafter. These withdrawals are to be supplemented with up
to about 50,000 acre-feet of additional Edwards Aquifer pumping rights by purchase or lease
of water rights from irrigators. For a summary of SAWS water pumpage and aquifer levels,
see San Antonio Water System, http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.saws.org/our-
water/future/short term.shtml.
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While consumers in urban areas are facing a water price squeeze,
irrigators are experiencing a different phenomenon. The behavior of relative
product and factor prices in the agricultural sector within the aquifer region
followed the national pattern of performance of agriculture. While farm
receipts were falling, farm costs were rising.79 One immediate impact of
falling product prices is to increase the willingness on the part of farmers to
lease or sell water rights. There are two main reasons why there has not
occurred widespread sale or lease of water rights by farmers. First, the
implementing regulations for use of aquifer water have not been finalized.
But more importantly, farmers rationally suspect the existence of
considerable rents in the water market and are willing to wait for the day
when water lease prices rise to the amount of the rent. The argument is that,
should a major increase in urban water demand occur as a result of a
drought or population increase, the City of San Antonio, for example, can
meet this demand only through new water development projects. These
projects would make water prices much higher than the current water lease
price of $80 per acre-foot.' Some have intimated that a water lease price of
about $800 per acre-foot is a possibility. 81 This divergence in the current and
potential lease price of water has encouraged the emergence of a private
agency to market water in the aquifer region.82
b. Constitutional Order
The demand for new institutional arrangements is also influenced
by the constitutional order. The constitutional order is the "set of
fundamental political, social, and legal ground rules that establishes the
basis for production, exchange, and distribution." 83 One can point to at least
two fundamental changes in constitutional rules that have influenced the
demand for institutional change governing water use in the aquifer region.
One such change in the constitutional order was the creation of the EUWD
79. For example, using the base period 1990 to 1992, the All Farm Products Index of
Prices Received by Farmers in October 2001 "dropped a record 10 points (9.5 percent) to 95
percent from the September Index." "On the other hand, the October Index of Prices paid by
farmers for production inputs suc i as Commodities and Services, Interest, Taxes, and Farm
Wage Rates (PPITW) was 123 la:.e;ent of the 1990-92 base period average. Prices paid by
farmers represent the average costs of inputs purchased by farmers and ranchers to produce
agricultural commodities." Jose G. Petia, Continuing Weak Agriculture Outlook Requires Carefid
Planning for Survival, 17 AG-ECO NEWS, Nov. 7, 2001, at 1.
80. Telephone interview with Jose Petla, Extension Economist, Uvalde County (Feb. 22,
2002).
81. See Edwardswater.com, http://edwardswater.com/.
82. Id.
83. LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN
ECONoMIc GROWTH 6 (1971).
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by the Texas Legislature in 1959.8 The EUWD was not the first district to be
created in Texas,ss and even though it lacked the typical -authority that
underground water authorities have,86 its creation marks a significant event
in the evolution of institutions within the aquifer region. As Putnam points
out, "Even though the District consisted of representatives from the five major
counties linked to the aquifer, it lacked the authority to limit pumping or even
to require people to register their wells."' Despite its obvious deficiency, the
formation of the EUWD "brought together stakeholders who represented
many different interests in this dispute." ss Also, by demonstrating the
possibility for consensus-building, the EUWD reinforced the long-standing
practice of local control of water resources as opposed to a broad statewide
rule to control ground water in the region.' The significance of the EUWD is
that it laid a foundation for what later became the Authority, the primary
agent responsible for the management of the aquifer.'
For over two decades there has been a marked increase in the
number of environment-related lawsuits brought by private parties and
environmental groups. One plausible explanation for the increase in suits
is the change in constitutional rules in the form of standing rules.9' Some
84. See Feeny, supra note 1, at 180, for a discussion of how the extension of suffrage in the
1800s (a change in constitutional rule) influenced demand for new institutional arrangements
in the form of property rights to land and the resulting change in land holdings from a regime
of large land ownership to a regime of small holdings.
85. For a detailed analysis of water districts in Texas, see FRANK F. SKILLERN, TEXAS
WATER LAw 191-260 (1991).
86. Districts may regulate well spacing, enjoin wasteful water practices such as allowing
water to flow into roadside ditches, and conduct public education programs. See RONALD A.
KAISER, HANDBOOK OF TExAS WATER LAW 32-33 (1986).
87. Putnam & Peterson, supra note 37, at 130 (citing N. Wolf, Mayor: An Inside View of San
Antonio Politics, 1981-1985, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, 1997). See also supra notes 32-34.
88. Putnam & Peterson, supra note 37, at 132.
89. Former Mayor of San Antonio Henry Cisneros described the plan developed by the
EUWD management team as "the finest example of consensus building." Id. (citing SAN
ANTONIO LIGHT, July 29,1988). It is notable that local control of water resources was also the
position of the Texas Farm Bureau and most of the Parties that filed Amici in the Sierra Club
Case. See Correspondence from Greg Ellis, Edwards Aquifer Authority (Jan. 7, 2002) (on file
with author).
90. Even though Article 1, Section 1.42 (a) of the Act repealed the EUWD, (b) through (e),
read together, suggest that the Edwards Aquifer Authority is to be a successor agency to the
EUWD.
91. The Supreme Court has articulated the constitutionally imposed requirements for
associational standing. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the court held that
[elven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing
solely as the representative of its members... .The association must allege
that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened
injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a
justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit... .So long as this
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commentators have pointed to the inconsistency and unpredictability of the
Supreme Court's standing rules until recently.' Environmental groups were
particularly alarmed by the Supreme Court ruling in the case of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,93 where the Court refused to apply the "injury-in-fact"
requirement in determining standing. The Defenders of Wildlife filed suit
seeking the application of the Endangered Species Act to activities funded
by the United States in foreign countries. In this case, U.S. funds were to be
used to fund an irrigation project in Sri Lanka and to rebuild the Aswan
Dam on the Nile River in Egypt. The project in Sri Lanka threatened the
endangered elephant found in the region, and the project on the Nile River
threatened an endangered crocodile. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Defenders had failed to show that one or more of their members would be
"directly" affected from their "special interest" in the subject.'
The ruling in Lujan cast doubt on what most considered to be the
standing rule as implied by a previous ruling in the case of Sierra Club v.
Morton.95 The Court in Morton denied standing to the Sierra Club because
it failed to show that any of its-members would be adversely affected by the
development complained about. In effect, the High Court was willing to
grant standing to an organization that demonstrates that its members would
be adversely affected by failure of a governmental agency to comply with
an environmental statute. It is in light of this "injury-in-fact" standing rule
that the Lujan ruling sent shock waves through the environmental
movement community.' Thus, when the Supreme Court granted standing
to an environmental group, Friends of the Earth (FOE), in the case of Friends
of the Earth v. Laidlaw, environmental groups were reinvigorated.97
The change in constitutional rules in the form of citizens' standing
clearly enhanced the chances of a successful challenge by the Sierra Club
against the rule of capture. One important change brought about by the
can be established, and so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief
sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party
indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an
appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court's
jurisdiction.
Id. at 511.
92. See Hudson P. Henry, Case Note, A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of
the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (2001).
93. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
94. Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735, 739 (1972)).
95. Morton, 405 U.S. 727.
96. Henry, supra note 92, at 236-37.
97. Id. at 252. Although the continuing compromise between private and public law
models of standing and separation of powers issues remains a source of uncertainty, Laidlaw
signifies a much more predictable and progressive citizen suit standing doctrine. After years
of marginal usefulness, environmental citizen suits have been given new life. Id.
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Laidlaw decision is that the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing was
extended to include a plaintiff's relationship with the environment and an
examination of congressional intent in legislation.98 Prior to this decision,
several environmental suits had been dismissed because Plaintiffs could not
prove any direct injury, and their claim of injury due to their special
relationship with the environment had been considered "speculative."
In the Texas Sierra Club suit, the Plaintiff's key witness was
Professor Clark Hubbs, the Regents Professor Emeritus of Zoology at the
University of Texas, Austin, who has spent a lifetime of teaching and
research on the ecology and fish life in Texas rivers and lakes. Professor
Hubbs' background and his contribution to our understanding of the
ecology of rivers and fish in the State of Texas, and the potential "injury" to
him should the Edwards-dependent species be destroyed, clearly meet the
"injury-in-fact" standard announced in Laidlaw. Indeed, after over 35 years
of study of aquatic life in the Edwards region, even a Morton or Lujan court
would have been hard pressed to find Professor Hubbs' interest
"speculative." 99 The willingness of the court to recognize the recreational
interest as basis for granting standing, as in the situation in Laidlaw, and the
research and professional interest as in Sierra Club, is an example of a
change in constitutional rule that lowers the transaction costs facing
environmental groups in bringing lawsuits to enforce environmental laws.
It is in this sense that a change in constitutional rule could encourage the
demand for institutional changes that allow individuals to take advantage
of opportunities in the society.
c. Size of the Market
The size of the aquifer water market is an important factor in the
demand for institutional change to manage water in the region.' ° An
98. One FOE member, Kenneth Lee Curtis, averred that he lived near the facility and
occasionally drove over the river. Curtis stated that he would like to "fish, camp, swim, and
picnic in and near the river between 3 and 15 miles downstream from the facility." Friends of
the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 181-83. Other plaintiff group members attested to similar concerns.
See id. Citizens League for Environmental Action Now member Gail Lee averred that her
home near Laidlaw's facility "had a lower value than similar homes located further from the
facility, and that she believed the pollutant discharges accounted for some of the
discrepancy." Id.
99. In conversations with the Sierra Club's (Plaintiff) attorney, Mr. Stuart Henry, he
pointed out that he could not foresee any existing standing rule that would have defeated Mr.
Hubbs' credentials. Interview with Professor Clark Hubbs, Regents Professor Emeritus of
Zoology, University of Texas, Austin (June 4, 2002).
100. See Feeny, supra note 1 (suggesting that the introduction of general laws of incor-
poration, especially limited liability laws, as a new institutional arrangement was in response
to an expansion in the size of the market made possible through improved transportation and
economies of scale due to technological advances and how the limited liability company
made it possible to obtain capital for investment purposes from several individuals).
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expansion in the size of the market allows fixed costs to be spread over a
large number of transactions, leading to economies of scale.1"' The resulting
economies of scale means that fixed costs become less of an impediment to
institutional innovation and interested parties may take advantage of the
lower market entry costs to seek changes in institutions.'02
The Texas water code contains a ranking of the preferences for
water uses in the State." The ranking gives some indication of what may
be considered the "water market" in Texas. While recreational use is
included, albeit as a low priority preference, one may argue that a broader
specification of preferences may be useful in light of events that led to the
observed institutional innovation. Concerns about domestic, municipal,
industrial, and irrigation uses of water are of the highest priority and
essentially defined the water scarcity sources of the institutional changes
that occurred in the aquifer region. However, it was concern about a much
lower priority use that dealt a blow to the rule of capture. Under the Water
Statute, recreational use of water is of low priority, and use for environ-
mental protection is not even mentioned. One could argue that the catchall
priority - public welfare - captures environmental use priority. But even in
this case, environmental use is treated only as a residual priority even
though primarily environmental concerns led to a change in institutional
arrangements in the aquifer region.1"4 The problem in including environ-
mental use as a component of the water market is valuation. For example,
how much is an endangered species worth? The difficulty in placing
monetary values on some of the benefits of institutional change is an
important consideration in quantitative analysis of institutional change.'
5s
The market for aquifer water also includes instream uses even
though such use is not extensively discussed in the literature. Water
recreation related expenditures in the Guadalupe region generated over
$155 million in 1995."°6 Inshore and offshore commercial fish landings in the
Guadalupe Estuary generated an estimated $20 million and about 497
jobs. °7 The San Marcos River Foundation has applied for a water right
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.024 (Vernon 1983).
104. The series of lawsuits filed by the Sierra Club have all been concerned with the
protection of the Edwards Aquifer-dependent species.
105. See infra Part III for further discussion of non-quantifiable benefits and costs in the
jurisprudence of institutional change.
106. Recreational activities include boating, fishing, and birdwatching. LONNIE L. JONES
& AYSEN TANYERI-ABUR, IMPACTS OF RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING AND COASTAL
RESOURCE-BASED TOURISM ON REGIONAL AND STATE ECONoMIEs 7 (Tex. Water Resources Inst.,
TR-184, 2001).
107. Id. at 16.
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permit intended to keep over a million acre-feet of water in the Guadalupe
River to protect estuaries and bays."°
2. The Supply of Institutional Change
The interaction between political actors, strategic groups, and key
institutional players like the courts determines the supply of institutional
changes in a constitutional democracy."° The threshold issue is the
capability and willingness of the major actors to supply institutional
change.1 ' There are considerable degrees of freedom in defining those
factors that affect a supply curve. Some of the key factors influencing the
willingness and capability to supply institutional change include the
existing stock of knowledge, the costs of institutional design, the
implementation of new arrangements, and the expected net benefits to
powerful elite decision makers who exercise positions of dominance."'
a. Stock of Existing Knowledge and Technology
Scientific knowledge about groundwater resources has contributed
in important ways to the evolution of institutions governing ground water
in Texas. Generally, new knowledge and technology have the effect of
lowering the marginal cost curve for institutions, thereby increasing the
supply of institutions.
It is significant that the historical adoption of the rule of capture
was to an extent determined by knowledge and technology. In the early
case of Houston & Texas Central Railway Co. v. East,"2 the court's rationale for
adopting the rule of capture was based primarily on the lack of knowledge
about the hydrology of ground water."3 Decisions in several subsequent
cases have been greatly influenced by new knowledge about the hydrology
108. The permit requests about 1.3 million acre-feet of water, an amount of water
estimated by the Texas Parks and Wildlife to be what is needed to satisfy the biological needs
of the Guadalupe estuary. The Foundation has also applied for 157,000 acre-feet to protect the
San Marcos River. Kevin Carmody, Foundation Hopes to Protect Rivers with Water Rights,
AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, July 28,2001, at B1. The Guadalupe River is an integral component
of the Edwards region water market.
109. See Feeny, supra note 1, at 183 (the supply of institutional changes depends on the
capability and willingness of the political order to provide new arrangements).
110. Id.
111. Here we have limited ourselves to those factors considered most critical in the
Edwards Aquifer context.
112. 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
113. Because the existence, origin, movement, and course of such waters, and the
causes which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult, and
concealed[,] an attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them
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of ground water. For example, in the case of Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., the
court used knowledge of groundwater hydrology in making a distinction
between the "underflow" of a water course and "percolating" ground
water, which is the object of the rule of capture."" In the Denis case, the
court concluded that a spring from which a landowner withdrew water had
the characteristics of a surface stream subject to state control.15
New scientific information about the relationship between
groundwater withdrawals and land subsidence has been a source of change
in the groundwater rule of capture. The primary change has been a
movement away from the pure English rule of no liability for injury to a
landowner caused by groundwater withdrawals to a rule that recognizes
some basis for recovery for such injury. Also, new knowledge has been used
to regulate land use practices such as well spacing and drilling. The leading
case is Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, in which
the Supreme Court of Texas explicitly acknowledged the importance of new
scientific knowledge in the regulation of groundwater resources in Texas. 16
Once legislators were supplied with new knowledge about the hydrology
of ground water, the cost of supplying institutions change was lowered,
thereby increasing the supply of institutional change. The availability of
new knowledge in combination with the Supreme Court's recognition of the
constitutional authority of the legislature to regulate groundwater
production in the state led one commentator to conclude that the
Friendswood ruling offers an "invitation to the state legislature to take
further action.""' The passage of SB 1477 was in effect a predictable event.
The Denis case also highlights the role of new knowledge in
defining groundwater rules."' In Denis, a downstream landowner filed an
action to stop an upstream landowner from using water adjacent to a spring
for irrigation purposes. The upstream landowner had drilled a well adjacent
114. See HUTCHINS ET AL., supra note 53, at 564.
115. Denis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771 S.W.2d 235,236 (rex. Ct. App. 1989) (writ denied).
The subterranean watercourse must have the same characteristics as a surface watercourse -
beds, banks forming a channel, and a current of water. Id. (citing C. KINNEY, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS § 1195, at 2167 (2d ed. 1912)).
116. 576 S.W.2d 21 (rex. 1978).
As heretofore mentioned, the Legislature has entered the field of regulation
of ground water withdrawals and subsidence. This occurred after geologists,
hydrologists, and engineers had developed more accurate knowledge con-
cerning the location, source, and measurement of percolating underground
waters, and after legislators became aware of the potential conflicts inherent
in the unregulated use of ground water under the English rule of ownership.
Id. at 29.
117. 3 WATERSAND WATER RIGHTS § 20.07(a), at 20-39 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (2003 repl.
vol.).
118. Denis, 771 S.W.2d 235.
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to the spring and in so doing limited the amount of water that flowed from
the spring to the downstream user. The downstream user argued for the
water from the well to be treated as an underground stream and therefore
subject to regulation by the state. An Appeals court relied primarily on the
scientific evidence presented by two hydrologists and concluded that the
groundwater source did not have the characteristics of a stream to be
subjected to regulation by the State." 9
Prior to the Denis case, the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority
(GBRA) had filed an action seeking to declare the aquifer an underground
river.120 As one commentator put it, the narrow configuration and rapid
flow and recharge characteristics of the aquifer encouraged the view that it
is a well-defined underground stream. 2 In 1991, the Texas Water
Commission (TWC) picked up the thread started by the GBRA and sought
a ruling from the Attorney General of Texas on whether they had the
legislative authority under section 28.011 of the Texas Water Code to
declare the aquifer an underground stream." 2 Even though the attorney
general did not find any legal basis to support TWC's claim to delegated
legislative authority, the TWC still went ahead to declare the aquifer an
underground stream subject to state control." The TWC felt that they had
enough knowledge about the hydrology of ground water to support the
declaration. 24 The TWC decision was overturned by the district court of
Travis County.12
b. The Cost of Design and Implementation of Institutional Change
Feeny has suggested that the cost of groundwater institutions that
originate from within a community are generally lower than those imposed
119. The subterranean watercourse must have the same characteristics as a surface
watercourse-beds, banks forming a channel, and a current of water. Id. at 236.
120. See In Re Adjudication of Rights to Water in the Edwards Aquifer, No. 89-0381 (Dist.
Ct. Hays County 1989).
121. Robert Pressley, Alternative Legal Bases for Managing the Edwards Aquifer, 22 ST. B. TEX.
ENVTL. L.J. 42, 46 (1991).
122. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 28.011 (Vernon 1993) ("Except as otherwise provided by
this code, the commission may make and enforce rules and regulations for protecting and
preserving the quality of underground water.").
123. See 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 298 (1992) for the TWC Emergency rule declaring the
Edwards Aquifer an underground stream, and 31 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 298 (1992) for the
permanent rules.
124. Knowledge of the unique characteristics of the Aquifer included (1) well-defined
boundaries, (2) well-defined sources of water, (3) rapid flow in a well-defined direction, (4)
well-defined destinations of the aquifer water to discharge at the springs, and (5) the presence
of fish and other aquatic life. See Votteler, supra note 32, at 121.
125. See McFadin v. Tex. Water Comm'n, No. 92-05214 (Dist. Ct. Travis County 1992).
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by a governmental bureaucracy. 26 A rational explanation for the lower cost
is that since the institutions developed by the community are based on
consensus, compliance and enforcement costs would be lower than the costs
associated with institutions imposed by fiat. Arguing along these lines, one
would conclude that the cost of the factors of production in institutional
design in the aquifer region is lower than an alternative system that would
have entailed extensive governmental control. Texas has used the ground-
water conservation district management framework to promote local
control of resources. As one commentator has argued, the primary reason
some opposed the abandonment of the rule of capture was to ensure local
control of water resources. The rule of capture promotes the creation of
groundwater conservation districts as opposed to a statewide regulatory
scheme.127
Non-quantifiable costs may also be significant, including process
costs, such as costs of assembling parties in negotiation, discussing a partic-
ular aquifer management plan, and making decisions about alternatives.
Sometimes also, rules and regulations may overlap and raise
compliance costs. Parties in negotiations may adopt costly holdout tactics
and may also over-invest to prevent opportunism. Special interest influence
may also increase costs, especially where such influence leads to the
creation of capturable rents by parties in strategic positions to do so.
c. Benefits of Institutional Change as the Source of Supply
The creation of an aquifer management entity and the requirements
of permits for the withdrawal of ground water effectively ended the common
law rule of capture as it pertains to the aquifer. The benefit of this transition
may be examined from both procedural and substantive perspectives.
As a procedural matter, prior to the institutional change, one
acquired groundwater water rights incident to the acquisition of land.
Under the rule of capture, the owner of a well had no assurance that water
would be available. The rules under the new regime remove this
uncertainty by establishing one management entity with clearly defined
jurisdiction. In addition, the new rules have established procedures for
public input, hearings, notices, and comment on proposed regulations.' 28
126. See Feeny, supra note 1 (comparing the cost of groundwater institutions in California
that were designed by voluntary organizations and those in Arizona where the institutions
were of a bureaucratic origin. Feeny concluded that the California system was cheaper.).
127. Interview with Greg Ellis, General Manager, Edwards Aquifer Authority (Jan. 7,
2002).
128. All enforcement proceedings under the Act are subject to the Administrative
Procedure and Texas Register Act, TEx. GOVT CODE ANN. ch. 2001 (Vernon 1988). See
Edwards Aquifer AuthorityAct § 1.37(r).
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Considerable substantive welfare benefits to the aquifer region and
the State of Texas are created under the new rules. Simulation results based
on a mathematical programming model quantitatively assess the welfare
benefits of the institutional changes that occurred within the aquifer
region."
III. QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
Both the demand and supply of institutional changes depend on
whether the benefit of the change exceeds the cost. In the context of the
aquifer, the question arises as to whether benefits associated with the
change from the common law rule of capture to a regulated groundwater
regime exceed the cost.
In its findings and declaration of policy, the Texas Legislature
declared the aquifer to be a distinctive natural resource. The legislature also
emphasized the need to protect the interests of the various publics that
depend on the aquifer through the formation of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority. 3° Whether the legislature made the right decision in entrusting
the management of the aquifer to the Authority is not easy to ascertain
because of several complex and sometimes difficult dilemmas. For example,
how should the Authority balance the protection of a valued natural
resource against the possible extinguishment of the hallowed principle of
private property rights? Or how well have groundwater and surface water
linkages been exploited to support an efficient water management system?
These complexities are not fatal to a systematic examination of the real costs
and benefits associated with the observed institutional change.
A. Quantifiable Costs Associated with the Institutional Change
This study employed a simple technique to obtain some estimates
of the substantive and procedural costs associated with the institutional
change. According to the Legislative Budget Board, the total budget for the
administration and enforcement of the Act is between $10 and $14
million.1 3' Litigation and court costs incurred by various strategic parties to
the dispute were added to the estimated administrative and enforcement
costs. One agency official put its overall agency costs to date at $5 million.
Using a published base cost figure for this agency, we calculated a cost
129. See Interview with Greg Ellis, supra note 127.
130. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act § 1.01.
131. See St. of Tex. Legis. Budget Board, Fiscal Note, 73rd Regular Sess. (1993) (memo from
Jim Oliver, Director, to Honorable Bill Sims, Chair, Committee on Natural Resources (rex.
Senate Chamber) (May 10, 1993).
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inflation index as the ratio of this agency's published 1990 cost to its current
cost. This index was used as the common factor to estimate the current costs
for other agencies based on their known 1990 costs. The current costs for the
City of San Antonio, SAWS, the GBRA, and the EUWD were included in the
calculation. 132 The estimated current total cost for these stakeholders is
about $25 million. An additional amount of about $50 million was included
in the initial EDSMIR model to account for in-house process costs and costs
incurred by various non-governmental agencies involved in the aquifer
dispute.33 Adding it all up yields a total cost of about $84 million. Clearly,
this is a considerable over-estimate of what may be termed the transaction
costs associated with the institutional change that occurred with respect to
the aquifer. The assessment of benefits is made against this estimated cost.
B. Non-quantifiable Costs of the Institutional Change
There are several non-quantifiable costs associated with all
institutional changes. In the context of the aquifer, some of these costs may
indeed be more important than the quantified costs.
1. Process Costs
Since 1970, when the Texas Water Quality Board (TWQB) first
issued a "Board Order" for aquifer protection, numerous public hearings,
referenda, and meetings have been held, generating organizational costs
that cannotbe captured in any reasonable manner. Based on a chronology
of the aquifer debate, one could reasonably conclude that these
organizational costs exceed the quantified costs associated with litigation
and administration."M
2. Regulatory Dissonance
The costs associated with operating a system that depends on the
interface of federal, state, and local laws and regulations is likely to raise
compliance costs and pose significant challenges in implementation. The
132. The 1990 costs for the key stakeholders were City of San Antonio ($371,000); San
Antonio City Water Board ($272,000); the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority ($221,000); the
Edwards Underground Water District ($173,000). See TWC Brokers Compromise in Edwards
Aquifer Lawsuit, Legal Fees to $1 Million, 3 NEWWAVES (Newsl. of the Tex. Water Resources
Inst.), Mar. 1990, at 9, 9-10. The source of the base estimate of $5 million is intentionally
omitted.
133. This is obviously a very high figure but we chose to err on the side of caution and to
deflect any implication of underestimation of what may be considered the "transaction costs"
associated with the institutional change.
134. Between 1970 and 1993 when the Edwards Aquifer Bill was passed, there were over
50 major events organized by councils, local organizations, task forces, planning commissions,
boards, and technical committees.
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Corps of Engineers has participated in the construction of dams and
reservoirs.'35 These surface water resources directly influence negotiations
on the use of groundwater resources. Various state water agencies have also
been active in monitoring both the quality and quantity of water from the
aquifer, while local organizations such as the EUWD have also been active
in the debate over water from the Aquifer.
3. Holdouts
One could argue that bargaining costs more so than litigation costs
have been very high."' The chronology of the aquifer is replete with
instances of holdouts, delays, and threats by groups. For example, in
January 1989, Uvalde and Medina Counties voted to pull out of the
Edwards District, and later formed their own District, which was later
declared illegal.'37 Various attempts to mediate the allocation of aquifer
water also failed.
4. Special Interest Influence
A major difficulty in assessing the costs associated with the
institutional changes in the aquifer region is the inability to accurately
determine what costs and whose costs to count. In those situations where
interest groups directly participate in litigation or indirectly as amici, it is
often not difficult to determine costs. However, where interest groups work
to influence the nature of statutory criteria or wording of a particular
legislation, the costs are more challenging to quantify. Since the wording of
the statutory criteria influences future interpretation of a statute, groups
incur significant costs to influence the criteria ab initio. There is no
reasonable way to determine the extent of these costs even though they may
be substantial.
WV. THE BENEFITS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The welfare benefits of institutional change were estimated using
a model that depicts the interdependencies between the aquifer water and
surface water flows from the Nueces, San Antonio, and Guadalupe rivers."
135. For example, the Corps of Engineers joined with GBRA in the construction of Canyon
Lake and in 1974 Congress passed Public Law 93-943 authorizing the construction of Cibolo
Reservoir. See SAN ANTONIO WATER SYsTEM, HISTORY & CHRONOLOGY, http://www.saws.
org/who we-are/chrono/ chronol50.shtml (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
136. Putnam described the debate over the Edwards Aquifer as "intractable," suggesting
very high bargaining costs. Putnam & Peterson, supra note 37, at 158.
137. SAN ANTONIO WATER SYSTEM, supra note 135.
138. This model is referred to as The Edwards Aquifer Simulation Model (EDSIMR). See
Dhazn Gillig et al., An Economic, Hydrologic, and Environmental Assessment of Water Management
Alternative Plans for the South Central Texas Region, 33 J. AGRIC. & APPL. ECON. 59,61-71 (2001).
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The U.S. Geological Survey's (USGS) data on river/reservoir reaches
gathered from stream gauges were combined with data from a private
engineering firm, HDR Engineering, Inc., for use in the simulation
analysis.'39
The combination of groundwater and surface water data in the
model reflects the hydrological inter-connectedness between the river
systems and the aquifer through aquifer recharge, spring discharge, and
return flow. The model includes data on return flows from municipal and
industrial uses since return flows from agriculture are negligible.140 It is
assumed that the rate of return flow for municipal water is 55 percent and
for industrial water 34 percent. 14' The return flow rates are calculated as an
average across the counties in the region based on 1995 USGS National
Water-Use Data Files.'42 The model reflects the weather and climate
conditions in Texas to a remarkable degree by considering several
alternative weather and climate patterns.43 The model also captures the
Texas weather cycle and its effects on water availability in the aquifer by
using recharge data covering the period 1934 to 1996.'" The theoretical
details and structure of the model are discussed in the Appendix.
The beginning point in measuring the benefits of the institutional
change is to examine the legislative intent to effect the institutional changes
in the aquifer region. The intent was to (1) protect terrestrial and aquatic
life; (2) protect domestic, municipal, and industrial water supplies; and (3)
promote the economic development of the state.45 The legislature also
endorsed water marketing as a means of putting water to its most valued
use.
146
139. Id. at 71.
140. Id. at 61.
141. HDR ENG'G, INC. & GERAGHTY & MILLER, INC., NUECES RIVER BASIN REGIONAL STUDY
(technical report prepared for the Edwards Aquifer Underground Water District, San Antonio,
Tex. 1993).
142. See USGS, http://water.usgs.gov/watuse/wudata.html (follow link to"USGS Water
Use in the United States" and "Download 1995 data for counties and watersheds").
143. "EDSIMR operates across a ten-state representation of the probability distribution of
recharge and associated precipitation ranging from very dry to very wet years." Gillig et al.,
supra note 138, at 62.
144. The years included, ordered from most dry to most wet, are 1956 (annual recharge
at 43,758 acre-feet), 1951, 1963,1989,1952, 1996, 1974, 1976, 1958, and 1987 (annual recharge
at 2,003,643 acre-feet).
145. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art. 1, § 1.01 (2003).
146. Id. art. 1, § 1.34(c).
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A. Protection of Terrestrial and Aquatic Life
Simulation results show that the goal to protect terrestrial and
aquatic life has been achieved. Table 2 shows the elevations at the aquifer,
springflows at the Comal and San Marcos springs, and water flows to the
Calhoun and Corpus bays. The simulations are undertaken under
alternative pumping limits as mandated under the Act. The implications of
introducing water marketing are also presented. The simulation projects
water use to the year 2012, based on legislative directives. The legislature
directed the Authority to "implement and enforce water management
practices, procedures, and methods to ensure that not later than December
31, 2012, the continuous minimum springflows of the Comal Springs and
San Marcos Springs are maintained to protect endangered and threatened
species to the extent required by Federal law."'4 7
Prior to the change in institutional arrangements, the most
environmentally sensitive spring, the Comal Spring, was almost dry.14 The
model results show that springflow in both the Comal Spring and San
Marcos Spring are adequate to protect the habitat for the one threatened
and seven endangered species listed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS). Under the "no water market" scenario, springflow exceeds both
the minimum "take" and "jeopardy" springflow levels defined by the
USFWS. 4 9
147. Id. art. 1, § 1.14(h).
148. Under the rule of capture, the "status quo" in Table 1, the model results yield a zero
cubic-feet per second (cfs) flow in the Comal Spring.
149. The minimum springflow to avoid "take" in the Comal is 200 cfs, and the minimum
to avoid "jeopardy" is 150 cfs. SAN MARCOS/COMAL RECOVERY TEAM & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., SAN MARCOS & COMAL SPRINGS & ASSOCIATED AQUATIC EcosysTEMS (REVISED)
RECOVERY PLAN 17 (1996).
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Table 2. Simulation Results for Elevations, Springflows, and Bay Flows: With and
Without Water Marketing Under Alternative Pumping Restrictions for Projected
Year 2012 Water Demand
Water Market No Water Market
Mandated Pumping Mandated Pumping
Limit Imposed Limit Imposed
Environmental Unitb Status 400 340 175 400 340 175
Attribute Quo' ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft.
J-17Elevation' feet 552.6 629.4 657.9 735.7 657.6 671.9 736.0
Sabinal Elevation feet 655.9 740.4 772.7 861.2 772.6 788.8 861.3
Comal Springflow Cfs 0.0 69.2 234.7 689.0 239.8 323.6 690.0
San Marcos Cfs 20.5 67.2 85.3 134.5 86.1 95.3 135.0
Springflow
Calhoun Bay Flow 103ac/ft 141.8 246.5 315.0 497.7 302.0 337.1 488.8
Corpus Bay Flow 103ac/ft 74.0 50.5 50.5 50.5 74.0 74.0 74.0
'The Index Well for the Edwards Aquifer is well J-17.
b Cfs is cubic-feet per second and measures the rate of flow of water in a stream.
c Status quo refers to the conditions of the Edwards Aquifer prior to the institutional changes.
Table 3. Simulation Results for Water Consumption by Major Stakeholders:
With and Without Water Marketing Under Alternative Pumping
Restrictions for Projected Year 2012 Water Demand
Water Market No Water Market
Mandated Pumping Mandated Pumping
Limit Imposed Limit Imposed
Water Unite Status 400 340 175 400 340 175
Consumption Quob ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft. ac/ft.
EA Agricultural 103ac/ft 84.8 75.7 75.7 75.7 86.3 86.4 75.7
Pumping
EA M&I Pumping 103ac/ft 467.8 324.1 264.2 99.2 252.6 222.2 92.1
Water Transfers 103ac/ft - 119.26 90.1 9.5 -
Value of Water $106 - 190.6 173.5 -0.4 -
Market I
'Cfs is cubic-feet per second and measures the rate of flow of water in a stream.
b Status quo refers to the conditions of the Edwards Aquifer prior to the institutional changes.
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Table 4. Simulation Results for Economic Welfare of Major Stakeholders: With
and Without Water Marketing Under Alternative Pumping Restrictions for
Projected Year 2012 Water Demand
Water Market No Water Market
Mandated Pumping Mandated Pumping
Limit Imposed Limit Imposed
Economic Welfare Unit Status 400 340 175 400 340 175
Quob  ac/ft, ac/fta/ft ac/ft. a cft. aLft
Agricultural $106 23.1 22.0 23.0 23.8 24.4 24.5 24.2
Income'
Agricultural $106 - 33.4 29.7 24.3 - - -
Incom ec _ _ 0_2 9 .
M & I Welfare $106 953.5 876.5 783.3 288.2 706.3 622.3 289.7
Total Welfare $106 976.6 909.9 813.0 312.5 730.7 646.8 313.9
' Cfs is cubic-feet per second and measures the rate of flow of water in a stream.
b Status quo refers to the conditions of the Edwards Aquifer prior to the institutional changes.
c Measured in US $millions.
B. Agricultural, Municipal, and Industrial Water Consumption
Read together with Table 2, simulation results in Table 3 support
some of the hypotheses offered to explain the sources of institutional
change. The two tables reveal the objectives for the major stakeholders:
environmentalists, municipal users, and irrigation users. In addition to
satisfying the environmental demand, increased municipal demand for
water as a result of population growth has significantly raised the scarcity
value of water relative to the value of water for irrigation purposes. By
introducing water marketing as an institutional innovation, water for
municipal use has been reallocated to restore equilibrium. Thus, Table 2
shows that, in the absence of a water market, irrigation use of water is not
significantly different from the status quo, while with the introduction of
water market institutions, irrigation use declines while municipal use
increases above the scenario with no market institutions. The phenomenon
is consistent with the induced institutional innovation explanation of
institutional change.
The results also explain why municipal users and environmental
groups advocated for abandonment of the rule of capture, and irrigation
users advocated for retention of the rule. The later shift in the position of
the irrigation users in support of water marketing is also consistent with
the property rights school that considers changes in institutions to be the
result of perceived opportunities made possible through technological
change.
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C. Welfare Benefits to Major Stakeholders
Table 4 presents the simulation results for total welfare benefits
and benefits to the major stakeholders in the aquifer region. Total welfare
declines with the introduction of pumping limits. The decline with no
water marketing is about $145.9 million at the threshold-pumping limit of
400 acre-feet. This decline is measured using the status quo welfare
measure as reference. When water marketing is allowed, however, the
decline in welfare is $66.7 million. The introduction of water marketing
leads to a gain of about $79.2 million. This represents a real gain if one
considers the fact that the $66.7 million loss does not take into account
gains in springflows to protect endangered species and the value of
downstream uses such as recreation.
With only a minor difference, the distribution of economic welfare
among the major stakeholders follows the pattern observed for total
welfare. Using the status quo as a reference point, irrigation users
(agriculture) gain slightly (about $1 million) under all pumping limits
scenarios when there is no water marketing. Under the full institutional
change (pumping limits with water marketing), agriculture suffers a slight
loss (about $1.1 million) when the pumping limit is 400 acre-feet, but there
is a slight gain (less than $1 million) under the 340 acre-feet and 175 acre-
feet pumping limit scenarios.
The pattern of economic welfare outcomes for municipal and
industrial users is different. There are welfare losses under all pumping
limits scenarios (market and no-market) for municipal and industrial
users. However, losses under the market scenarios are smaller than under
the non-market scenarios. In a sense, the municipal and industrial users
gained when market transfers are introduced even though they suffer
welfare losses when water marketing is not permitted.
What emerges from the simulated welfare outcomes is that the
institutional change from the rule of capture to a managed system with
water marketing leads to both total welfare losses and losses to the major
stakeholders in the aquifer region. This conclusion, however, must be
interpreted within the context of what the suppliers of institutional change
sought to do.
First, the legislature explicitly stated an interest in protecting the
"terrestrial and aquatic" life that is dependent on the aquifer."s While the
simulated model results show that springflows and bay flows are
adequate to satisfy the legislative directive, the model does not provide
empirical monetary values to permit a comparison of benefits and costs.
Studies indicate that benefits from springflows in the Comal and San
150. Edwards Aquifer Authority Act art.l, § 1.01.
Winter 2007]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Marcos rivers and flows to the Calhoun and Corpus bays for the
protection of "terrestrial and aquatic" life could be quite substantial. One
study has estimated that fish landings in the Guadalupe estuary generated
about $20 million, providing about 497 jobs in 1995. The same study
estimated that recreational travel spending in the region reached about
$154 million.'5 1 This admittedly rough estimate suggests that, when all
benefit sources are considered, one would conclude that economic welfare
did not decline as a result of the institutional change. This is true under
the 400 acre-feet pumping limit, with or without water marketing.
It is quite plausible that the simulated economic welfare results
underestimate the benefits of the institutional change. The water market
in the aquifer is best characterized as a monopsony, that is, a single buyer
facing a group of perfectly competitive sellers. SAWS is by far the largest
buyer of water rights in the aquifer region. 5 2 SAWS sets the purchase
price of water and buys water rights from a large number of landowners
in the region. As the dominant or sole buyer of water rights with the
ability to set the price of water, a permit holder has to either sell to SAWS
or hold the permit. While the cost of water development is a critical factor
in setting water price, SAWS' monopsony position allows it to offer prices
below competitive price levels and in the end to capture economic rents
or economic factor (water) rents."5 3
One implication of the observed water market structure is that
economic welfare estimates may be low due to deadweight losses.'-" Some
of the deadweight loss is transferred to the monopsonist in the form of
higher profits but most is lost as a result of fewer water permits than
optimal being made available. It is well known that landowners in the
aquifer region are unwilling to offer their land for lease or for sale because
the price for water permits being offered by SAWS is too low and not
reflective of the true price of permits. SAWS is currently paying between
151. The reader may note that Calhoun County lies in the Guadalupe estuary, and what
is referred to as the Calhoun estuary is part of the larger Guadalupe estuary. See LONNIE L.
JONES & AYSEN TANYERI-ABUR, IMPACTS OF RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING AND
COASTAL RESOURCE-BASED TOURISM ON REGIONAL AND STATE EcONOMIcS 7,16 (Texas Water
Resources Institute, TR-184, 2001).
152. SAWS is currently spending approximately $1.87 million per year on water lease
payments. Interview with Gene Camargo, Water Resources Department, SAWS (Aug. 28,
2002).
153. Economic rent represents payments for water in excess of what would be necessary
to get water permit holders to offer them to the marketplace. See BRIAN R. BINGER & ELIZABETH
HOFFMAN, MICROECONOMICS WITI CALCULUS 455 (1985).
154. The deadweight loss from monopsony is due to losses in consumer and producer
welfare as a result of having fewer than the optimal number of water transfers occurring in
the Edwards region. Cf. definition of deadweight loss due to monopoly. See id. at 460.
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$75 to $80 per acre-foot per year for leases.' 5 The price for outright sale of
water rights has been in the range of $1,200 to $4,400."s
Some have argued that the price offered by SAWS for its leases is
too low because the economic price of water is not the price of water in its
current use, that is, for irrigation purposes, but rather the price of water
based on developing an alternative source to meet demand. The position
of water permit holders is that, if SAWS were to meet its current and
future water needs using non-aquifer sources, it would have to pay much
higher prices for water than the $80 per acre-foot that it is currently
paying. According to estimates by a regional planning group, the lowest
per acre cost of alternative water for SAWS is about $590 per acre-foot for
water out of the Carrizo Aquifer, while the per acre-foot price could be as
high as $1,407 for desalinated water.5 7 The monopsonistic position of
SAWS makes it difficult to determine the extent of deadweight losses and
hence the size of economic benefits in the aggregate and to strategic
groups.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A major institutional change occurred in the Texas water sector
with the implementation of Senate Bill 1477, which created the Edwards
Aquifer Authority Act to manage water withdrawals from the Edwards
Aquifer. The Act places pumping limits on water withdrawals, mandates
minimum spring flows to protect endangered species, lays the foundation
for water marketing, and subjects water withdrawals from the aquifer to
a permitting scheme similar to the rules governing surface water. Imple-
mentation of SB 1477 effectively ended the institutional arrangement - the
rule of capture as applied to the aquifer- and replaced it with a permit
system that promoted water marketing.
This article found the existing stock of knowledge, the
technological change, the constitutional order, the size of the market, and
the changes in relative product and factor prices to be important
determinants of the demand and supply of institutional change within the
155. See Edwardswater.com, http://EDWARDSWATER.com/.
156. Id.
157. These estimates are based on studies by the South Central Texas Regional Water Plan
(SCTRWP). Other alternatives and corresponding per acre-foot costs are the Simsboro Aquifer
($707) (S. Central Tex. Region Water Supply Options, Option Data Sheet, Option No. SCTN-3c
(Dec. 31, 1999)); Lower Guadalupe water ($788) (S. Central Tex. Region Water Supply
Options, Option Data Sheet, Option No. SCTN-16b (Dec. 6, 1999)); Colorado River water
($677) (S. Central Tex. Region Water Supply Options, Option Data Sheet, Option No. C-17A
(Nov. 2, 1999)). The group also estimated the price of water for irrigation purposes to be
between $51 and $80 per acre-foot.
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Edwards Aquifer region. There is evidence of considerable impact of
technological changes and new knowledge on institutional changes with
respect to the aquifer. For example, new knowledge about well spacing
and improvements in drilling technology to avoid land subsidence all
combined to restrict the rule of capture.
Institutional change in the Edwards Aquifer region has also been
influenced by the size of the water market and changes in the
constitutional order. Until recently, water for the protection of endangered
species and instream flows was not considered as important as other
sectors of the water market. Today, this is not the case. Several
environmental groups are pressuring for changes in water laws to
facilitate water flows to Texas's bays and estuaries. This expansion in the
water market has been made possible through changes in the
constitutional order in the form of standing rules.
The analysis shows that the switch from the rule of capture to a
permit system responds adequately to the policy goal of SB 1477 to protect
a valuable state resource, the aquifer. The results also show that the policy
objective to protect the endangered and threatened species in the aquifer
region was also achieved. Thus, the results show increased flows in the
San Marcos and Comal springs, the home of several endangered species,
compared to the situation before institutional changes occurred.
A major follow-up study that would shed more light on the
sustainability of the institutional changes within the Edwards Aquifer and
other regions in Texas is a just-completed interbasin water transfer model,
TEXRIVERSIM, which covers 21 out of 23 river basins in Texas.""
TEXRIVERSIM allows a user to evaluate proposed interbasin water
transfers in Texas. The model integrates stochastic flow, non-agricultural
demand, agricultural demand, climate effects, dryland/ irrigation system
choice, instream flow, estuary inflow, multiple basins, development
project fixed costs and capacity, and reservoir operation, among other
factors. Combined with the Edwards Aquifer Simulation Model (EDSIMR)
discussed in this article, there is an opportunity to dig deeper to examine
the implications of conjunctive water policy planning and implementation
in the State of Texas.
158. Bruce A. McCarl et al., Towards a Sustainable Water Policy in Texas: Developing
Capacity to Evaluate Transfers (2006) (funded by the Texas Higher Educational Coordinating
Board, Advanced Research/Advanced Technology Program and the Texas Agricultural
Experiment Station).
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APPENDIX
Model Development 9
The model used in this article is the Edwards Aquifer Simulation
Model (EDSIM) linked to a river model. The river model includes surface
water flows and aquifer interdependencies in the Nueces, San Antonio,
and Guadalupe Rivers.}" The linked model is the Edwards Aquifer
Simulation Model-River (EDSIMR). Monthly flows in the rivers are
incorporated in the form of a network flow model depicting flow between
river/reservoir reaches that were specified based on data from U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS) stream gauges and data provided by HDR
Engineering, Inc. 61 The river systems are hydrologically connected to the
aquifer through aquifer recharge, spring discharge, and return flow. Only
return flows from municipal and industrial uses are considered since
return flows from agricultural use are minor or non-existent. 62 The rate of
return flow is assumed to be 55 percent and 34 percent for municipal and
industrial use, respectively. This return flow rate is calculated based on
1995 USGS data as an average across the counties in the region. 63
EDSIMR operates across a ten-state representation of the
probability distribution of recharge and associated precipitation ranging
from very dry to very wet years. The probability distribution is an
empirical distribution based on the historical recharge of the Edwards
Aquifer data for the period 1934 to 1996. The years included, ordered from
most dry to most wet, are 1956 (annual recharge at 43,758 acre-feet), 1951,
1963, 1989, 1952, 1996, 1974, 1976, 1958, and 1987 (annual recharge at
2,003,643 acre-feet)."6
Theoretical Structure
EDSIMR is a price-endogenous mathematical program composed
of about 100,000 continuous variables and 35,000 constraints in a General
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). 6 The objective function maximizes
159. With only minor wording changes, this appendix is reproduced from our earlier
study, Gillig et al., supra note 138.
160. See McCarl et al., supra note 158.
161. HDR ENG'G, INC. & GERAGHTY & MILLER, INC., supra note 141.
162. See id.
163. See USGS, supra note 142.
164. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., SURVEYS OF IRRIGATION IN TEXAS 1958,1964,1969,1974,1979,
1984, 1989,1994 AND 2000 (Report 347, 2001).




the expected net benefits (benefits minus costs) of water use by municipal,
industrial, and agricultural sectors. Water use is drawn from regional
ground water or surface water depending upon availability at a particular
site. The region is subdivided into east and west for use from the aquifer
along with 52 river reaches and two other regions for use of non-aquifer
water. Demand curves are specified for municipal and industrial (M&I)
water based on estimates by Griffin and Chang and Renzetti, and by
county with discretionary and non-discretionary uses differentiated in
Bexar County (where San Antonio is located). 66 Agricultural use and
demand is developed using 65 regional linear programming models
defined for particular river reaches or groundwater usage areas, which
could pursue irrigated and/or dryland crop production.
EDSIMR is implemented through the use of a two-stage or
discrete stochastic programming model considering variability in yields
and resource usage.167 The stochastic events are defined by recharge and
associated weather/crop yields.
Eleven water management options identified by the HCP, which
are consistent with SCTRWPG, are included in EDSIMR as integer
variables. These decisions - whether or not water management strategies
should be adopted - are depicted as integer variable choices, build or not
build, with annual costs and capacities involved. The amount of water that
can be drawn from each water management strategy is limited by the
capacity of each water management strategy, and its corresponding
annual cost is considered in the objective function.
The model contains constraints on ground/surface water demand
and supply availability, agricultural crop mixes, pumping lift formation,
possible springflow or water use regulations, and nonnegativity
conditions.
Maximization Procedure
With a set of water management options incorporated, EDSIMR
chooses options to maximize net regional economic value. The model is set
up under projected 2012 water demand and no pumping limit versus a
400,000, 340,000, and 175,000 acre-feet per acre pumping limit. Regional
economic value is derived from a combination of perfectly elastic demand
for agricultural products, agricultural production costs, price elastic
municipal demand, price elastic industrial demand, and lift sensitive
166. Ronald C. Griffin & Chan Chang, Seasonality in Community Water Demand, 16 W.J.
AGRIC. ECON. 207 (1991); S. Renzetti, An Economic Study of Industrial Water Demands in British
Columbia, Canada, 24 WATER RES. REsEARcH 1569 (1988).
167. George B. Dantzig, Linear Programming Under Uncertainty, 1 MGMT. Sci. 197 (1955).
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pumping costs. The municipal demand elasticity is drawn from Griffin
and Chang, while the industrial elasticity is obtained from Renzetti.1' 6
Following Griffin and Chang, the quantity demanded by municipal users
depends on rainfall and climatic conditions. The following section
presents the specific objective function and constraints.
Objective Function
The objective function maximizes the expected net benefits
(benefits minus costs) of water use by municipal, industrial, and
agricultural sectors. Water use within each sector is drawn from either
ground or surface water (w). Benefits from using ground and surface
water in municipal and industrial sectors are determined by the areas
under the constant elasticity municipal and industrial demand curves
whereas benefits from using ground and surface water in the agricultural
sector are represented by the net agricultural income derived from
irrigated and dryland crop production (CROPPROD). Total water costs
consist of pumping/ diverting costs for the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors and water management plan costs. Fixed costs
associated with each water management alternative option (p) incur only
if that water management alternative option is adapted (BUILDPLAN),
whereas variable costs depend on the amount of water used
(NEVVWATER). This objective function is maximized subject to a set of
constraints including ground/surface water demand and supply balance
(both existent and newly developed supplies), agricultural production
activities (c), hydrologic regressions, nonnegative conditions for decision
variables, and binary conditions for water development decisions. The
objective function is probabilistically weighted by the state of nature or
weather conditions (r) to reflect the stochastic nature of weather. Variables
are in upper case and parameters are in lower case.
SPrbr .( 1X(irrincomerCROPPROD)
r C W
+ f MUNr dMUN + f INDr dIND
w w
-J Y agcostw * AGWATERm r - J micos tw * (MUNw + IND,)m c ww
annualcos * (Y NEWWATERmrp)
p m
168. Griffin & Chang, supra note 166; Renzetti, supra note 166.
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Initial Edwards Aquifer Elevation
The initial Edwards Aquifer elevation (INITIALLEVEL) measured
at J17 and Sabinal well indices is the average of the ending Edwards
Aquifer elevation (ENDLEVEL) weighted by the probability associated
with each state of nature in order to allow the Edwards Aquifer level to
fluctuate with the weather.
JNITIALLEVEL, = Y(prob, * ENDLEVEL,) V i = J17 and Sabinal well indices.
r
Ending Edwards Aquifer Elevation
The ending Edwards Aquifer elevation is a function of the initial
elevation, the Edwards Aquifer groundwater use (EDUSE), and the
Edwards Aquifer recharge (recharge). The ai represents the regression
parameter that was previously estimated in the Edwards Aquifer model
using the GWSIM-IV Edwards Aquifer Simulation Model
ENDLEVEL, = ao+arecharger + aZEDUSE +a31NITIALLEVELi Vi and r.
Springflow Regression
Springflows are generated by a regression, which is a function of
the initial Edwards Aquifer elevation levels at J17 and Sabinal index wells,
the Edwards Aquifer monthly recharge, and the aggregated Edwards
Aquifer water use. w and represent the regression parameters that were
previously estimated in the EDSIMR
SPRINGimr = (00 + OwgINITIALLEVEL +a arecharg emr+ a2ED USEmr
V i,m and r.
Crop Mixes
A crop mix constraint implies that a farmer's crop production
decision is a convex combination of crop mix (CROPMIX) in which all of
the lands used (irrigated or dry land) for a crop grown within a county
follows the historical crop mixes (mixdata) observed on irrigated and dry
land acres by crop and county from the years 1975 to 1996 as well as crop
mixes obtained from the 1994 farm program survey indicating what
would happen if the farm program were eliminated.
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CROPPROD = _(mixdata. * CROPMIXcv) Vr,candw.
Y
Irrigated Land
The constraint limits irrigated crop production to irrigated land
acres (LAND) available but allows irrigated land acres to be converted to
dryland (TODRY)
I jmixdata, -CROPMIX,, = land, - TODRYv V w.
y c
Dryland
This constraint limits dryland acres to those available plus those
converted from irrigated acres (sprinkler or furrow)
I jmixdata , CROPMIXW = land,-TODRY, V w.
y C
Irrigation Water Demand
The irrigated crop water demand by type of water is also limited
to be less than or equal to water available for irrigation by type of water
lwatrequiremrr .CROPPROD,<W JAGWATERmrcw V r, c, and w.
m m
Edwards Aquifer Pumping Balance
The total water demand for agriculture, municipality, and
industry using the ground water pumped from the Edwards Aquifer is
limited to be equal to the total amount of the ground water pumped from
the Edwards Aquifer. In general, the amount of water pumped from the
Edwards Aquifer (pump) is unlimited but is limited to 400,000, 340,000,
and 175,000 acft per year when the pumping limit is imposed




MUN"ed, + IND,"ed + AGWATERm,,,,de < pump,
m C
V m and r.
Vr
Irrigated Water
A water demand and supply balance limits water demand to less
than or equal to the total amount of supply available for each water type
(watsupply)
Y AG WA TER :!5; watsupplyrw V rand w
m,c
River System
The river system portrays a hydrological relationship among
upstream (up), downstream (s), as well as instream flows, reservoirs/lakes
release and spill, diversions, system channel loss, return flow, aquifer
recharge, springflow, and water transfers where seasonal refers to
municipal and industrial monthly seasonal distribution.
FLOWm + seasonal, m,,MUNrue + seasonal. dIIND,U: + IAGWATER mrcsur
+ XLOSSsmr + RECHARGEsmr - FloWupmr -INFLOWsmr - RETURIVFLOWmr
upriver up
-SPRINGsmr - JNEWWATER rp  0 V ik r,and s.
p
Water Management Alternative Plan
The decision whether a water management strategy, p, should be
adapted is viewed as a binary choice, to adapt or not to adapt. If adapted,
a water management strategy's variable cost is considered in the objective
function. The amount of water that can be drawn from each water
management strategy is limited by the capacity of each water management
strategy (capacity)
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BUILDPLANP r {0,1}
I NEWWATERmrp - capacityp *BUILDPLANP V r and p
Other Features and Constraints
There are a number of other features and constraints used in the
study but not presented in the Appendix. For example, the pumping lift
constraint is set as a function of J17 and Sabinal wells ending elevation
level. A full description of the model can be found in McCarl et al. 69
169. McCarl et al., supra note 158.
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